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Abstract:	
This	article	focuses	on	epistemic	challenges	related	to	the	democratisation	of	scientific	
knowledge	production,	and	to	the	limitations	of	current	social	accounts	of	objectivity.		
A	process	of	'democratisation'	can	be	observed	in	many	scientific	and	academic	fields	
today.	Collaboration	with	extra-academic	agents	and	the	use	of	extra-academic	expertise	
and	knowledge	has	become	common,	and	researchers	are	interested	in	promoting	socially	
inclusive	research	practices.	As	this	development	is	particularly	prevalent	in	policy-
relevant	research,	it	is	important	that	the	new,	more	democratic	forms	of	research	be	
objective.		
In	social	accounts	of	objectivity	only	epistemic	communities	are	taken	to	be	able	to	
produce	objective	knowledge,	or	the	entity	whose	objectivity	is	to	be	assessed	is	precisely	
such	a	community.	As	I	argue,	these	accounts	do	not	allow	for	situations	where	it	is	not	
easy	to	identify	the	relevant	epistemic	community.	Democratisation	of	scientific	knowledge	
production	can	lead	to	such	situations.	As	an	example,	I	discuss	attempts	to	link	indigenous	
oral	traditions	to	floods	and	tsunamis	that	happened	hundreds	or	even	thousands	of	years	
ago.1		
1.	Introduction	The	notion	of	a	scientific	community	or	an	epistemic	community	is	crucial	in	certain	influential	accounts	of	objectivity,	where	only	communities	are	taken	to	be	able	to	produce	objective	results,	or	where	the	entity	whose	objectivity	is	to	be	assessed	is	precisely	such	a	community.	In	these	social	accounts	of	objectivity,	it	is	usually	taken	for	granted	that	such	communities	exist	and	that	they	are	tolerably	easy	to	identify.	As	I	will	argue,	this	may	not	always	be	the	case.	The	problem	is	encountered	and	has	practical	relevance	in	many	contemporary,	'democratic'	forms	of	scientific	knowledge	production.	In	these	forms	of	research																																																									1	Early	versions	of	this	paper	were	presented	in	Tilburg	at	Objectivity	in	Science,	the	8th	Munich-Sydney-Tilburg	(MuST)	Conference	in	Philosophy	of	Science,	and	in	Helsinki	at	the	15th	Congress	on	Logic,	Methodology,	and	Philosophy	of	Science	(CLMPS).	I	am	grateful	to	the	audiences	at	these	meetings,	particularly	to	Jaana	Eigi,	Rico	Hauswald,	David	Ludwig,	Kristina	Rolin,	and	Paul	Teller,	for	their	questions	and	comments.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	two	anonymous	reviewers	and	the	editors	of	this	special	issue	for	their	extremely	helpful	remarks	on	earlier	versions	of	this	paper.	Finally,	I	am	grateful	to	Kati	Kallio	and	Karina	Lukin	for	the	advice	they	gave,	and	the	whole	research	team	at	the	Academy	of	Finland	Centre	of	Excellence	in	the	Philosophy	of	the	Social	Sciences	for	numerous	valuable	comments.	This	research	has	been	supported	by	the	Finnish	Cultural	Foundation.	
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it	may	be	difficult	or	impossible	to	identify	an	epistemic	community	whose	objectivity	could	be	assessed.	I	will	start	with	a	short	description	of	the	process	of	democratisation	that	has	led	to	a	multitude	of	new	research	practices	in	many	fields.	Assessing	the	objectivity	of	such	research	is	both	necessary	and	difficult.	I	then	proceed	to	the	current	philosophical	discussions	of	objectivity,	and	to	the	notion	of	research	communities	used	in	social	accounts	of	objectivity.	After	that,	I	continue	with	a	cautionary	example:	attempts	to	link	indigenous	oral	traditions	to	floods,	tsunamis,	or	geological	events	that	happened	hundreds	or	even	thousands	of	years	ago.	I	argue	that	some	of	these	attempts	are	problematic	because	the	researchers	who	make	them	are	not	in	contact	with	an	existing	scientific	community	that	could	offer	valuable	critique.	Finally,	I	conclude	that	social	accounts	of	objectivity	are	currently	unable	to	allow	for	situations	where	it	is	unclear	what	the	relevant	epistemic	community	is,	or	where	no	proper	community	exists.		The	democratisation	of	scientific	and	academic	knowledge	production	influences	the	humanities	as	well	as	the	natural	and	the	social	sciences.	I	will	therefore	use	a	"broad"	notion	of	science,	one	that	encompasses	all	academic	disciplines,	similarly	to	the	German	notion	of	Wissenschaft	and	the	Latin	scientia	(see	Hansson	2013).		
2.	Democratisation	of	science	A	process	of	'democratisation'	affects	many	areas	of	science	today.	New	forms	of	knowledge	and	new	sources	of	expertise	are	being	incorporated	into	science.	Collaboration	with	diverse	extra-academic	agents	–	such	as	local	communities,	private	enterprises,	patients'	associations,	or	artists	–	has	become	common,	and	researchers	in	many	fields	are	interested	in	promoting	socially	inclusive	research	practices.	Activist	research	has	gained	importance	in	fields	such	as	anthropology,	and	in	some	disciplines	such	as	development	studies,	transdisciplinarity	and	extra-academic	participation	have	become	almost	the	norm.	Researchers	all	over	academia	are	coming	up	with	'citizen	science'	projects.	In	many	disciplines,	as	well	as	in	transdisciplinary	projects,	scientists	attempt	to	build	bridges	between	scientific	and	extra-academic	knowledge	systems	and	to	take	tacit	knowledge,	the	knowledge	of	'experts	by	experience',	indigenous	knowledge,	artistic	knowledge,	and	other	forms	of	extra-academic	knowledge	into	account	in	their	work	(Smith	1999;	Cooke	&	Kothari	2001;	Hirsch	Hadorn	et	al.	2008;	Koskinen	2015a).	This	kind	of	democratic	knowledge	production	is	often	supposed	to	create	solutions	to	pressing	social	and	practical	problems.	The	aim	is	to	take	all	relevant	viewpoints	and	all	available	knowledge	into	account	–	not	only	in	decision-making,	but	already	in	the	research	that	is	to	inform	it.	Thus	the	ongoing	
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democratisation	is	especially	prominent	in	fields	that	are	expected	to	produce	policy-relevant	knowledge.	It	is	also	highly	in	demand;	important	agents	in	science	policy	and	research	funding	have	increasingly	begun	to	stress	participation	and	transdisciplinarity	(e.g.	European	Science	Foundation	2013).		The	aim	of	democratising	scientific	knowledge	production	has	led	to	a	multitude	of	diverse	research	practices.	In	citizen	science	or	crowd	science,	scientists	devise	ways	for	volunteer	laypeople	to	take	part	in	some	particular	areas	of	scientific	knowledge	production.	Partly	as	a	result	of	postcolonial	critique,	researchers	in	many	fields	today	attempt	to	build	bridges	between	traditional,	often	non-Western	knowledge	systems	and	scientific	knowledge	systems,	or	even	integrate	them.	In	contemplative	neuroscience,	for	instance,	ideas	deriving	from	Buddhist	traditions	are	integrated	with	the	scientific	study	of	the	nervous	system.	Particularly	in	policy-relevant	research,	stakeholders	are	given	the	chance	to	be	involved	in	the	research	process.	In	extra-academic	collaborative	research,	scientists	typically	consult	stakeholders,	and	in	participatory	research	they	give	extra-academic	agents	the	role	of	co-researchers	and	co-authors.	At	times	the	aims	of	such	research	projects	are	emancipatory:	the	idea	is	to	change	the	relationship	between	researchers	and	laypeople	(or	research	subjects)	from	one	between	subject	and	object	to	one	between	subject	and	subject.	In	activist	
research	the	emancipatory	aims	are	particularly	prominent,	as	it	often	forms	an	integral	part	of	some	overtly	political	movement,	such	as	HIV/AIDS	activism,	or	the	indigenous	political	movements	worldwide.	Transdisciplinarity	is	promoted	as	a	way	to	solve	pressing	practical	problems	by	integrating	multiple	perspectives	and	sources	of	knowledge	–	both	scientific	and	extra-academic.	(Smith	1997;	Hirsch	Hadorn	et	al.	2008;	Koskinen	&	Mäki	2016.)	The	new,	emerging	forms	of	research	have	engendered	discussions	not	only	in	the	disciplines	the	change	touches	upon,	but	also	in	science	studies,	where	'co-production'	or	'Mode	2	science',	and	recently	'open	science',	are	important	topics.	The	expertise	of	laypeople	is	being	recognised,	as	is	the	importance	of	listening	to	the	viewpoints	of	stakeholders	in	policy-relevant	research	(e.g.	Epstein	1996;	2007;	Nowotny,	Scott	&	Gibbons	2001;	Collins	&	Evans	2007).	There	is	also	a	growing	amount	of	philosophical	literature	on	the	expertise	of	'laypeople',	on	stakeholders	who	should	have	their	voice	heard	in	policy-relevant	research,	and	on	the	epistemically	important	criticism	that	extra-academic	agents	might	be	able	to	offer	to	researchers	(e.g.	Solomon	2009;	Wylie	2015).	Philip	Kitcher	has	formulated	a	much	discussed	view	of	the	role	of	science	in	a	democratic	society,	and	of	the	ways	in	which	extra-academic	agents	should	influence	scientific	knowledge	production	(Kitcher	2001;	2011;	see	also	Van	Bouwel	2009).	In	feminist	philosophy	of	science	and	postcolonial	science	studies,	the	idea	of	paying	attention	to	knowledge	held	by	socially	marginal	groups,	or	to	knowledge	produced	in	non-Western	knowledge	systems,	is	generally	embraced	(Figueroa	&	Harding	2003;	Harding	2011;	2015;	Wylie	2015).	
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Because	democratised	research	is	often	meant	to	be	policy-relevant,	it	is	important	for	it	to	be	reliable.	However,	this	is	not	necessarily	the	case.	A	recent	editorial	in	Nature	remarks	on	growing	concerns	related	to	the	democratisation	of	scientific	knowledge	production:	the	people	participating	in	citizen	science	projects	often	do	so	in	order	to	advance	their	political	goals,	and	this	may	lead	to	biases	(Nature	2015).		Democracy	does	not	guarantee	objectivity.	In	the	light	of	the	traditional	idea	of	objectivity	as	requiring	value-freedom,	or	more	precisely,	that	non-epistemic,	contextual	values	be	kept	out	of	the	"internal"	stages	of	science	(Douglas	2009;	Reiss	&	Sprenger	2014),	democratic	knowledge	production	seems	suspect.	The	situation	in	participatory	and	transdisciplinary	projects	is	typically	even	more	complex	than	the	editorial	in	Nature	recognises.	Often	researchers	actually	want	to	take	the	value-laden	viewpoints	of	extra-academic	agents	into	account.	This	is	the	case	especially	in	solution-oriented	research	that	touches	upon	issues	relevant	to	some	socially	marginal	stakeholder	group.	Some	philosophers	endorse	this	objective.	Many	have	acknowledged	the	importance	of	listening	to	the	interests	and	perspectives	of	extra-academic	agents	when	giving	direction	to	research,	for	instance	when	making	funding	decisions	(e.g.	Kitcher	2001;	2011;	see	also	Reiss	&	Sprenger	2014).	Standpoint	epistemologists	go	further	by	holding	that	researchers	should	emphasise	the	unique	standpoints	of	socially	marginal	groups.	This	is	because	research	that	aims	at	social	neutrality	may	end	up	representing	the	point	of	view	of	the	socially	privileged	(Wylie	2003;	Harding	2004;	Jaggar	2004).	It	may	also	be	hard	to	avoid	value-ladenness	in	the	emerging,	democratic	forms	of	research.	Stephanie	Solomon	(2009)	highlights	the	importance	of	differentiating	between	extra-academic	agents	as	stakeholders	who	bring	in	values	and	viewpoints,	and	as	experts	or	sources	of	knowledge.	I	agree	that	the	distinction	is	important,	but	such	differentiation	may	not	always	be	easy.	It	is	not	obvious	that	values,	for	instance,	can	be	separated	from	tacit	knowledge	or	indigenous	knowledge	systems,	or	that	the	two	roles	of	an	extra-academic	agent	as	an	expert	and	as	a	stakeholder	can	be	neatly	distinguished	from	each	other	in	practice.	In	other	words,	there	may	be	good	reasons	for	allowing	for	some	value-ladenness	in	the	new,	more	democratic	forms	of	research.	Moreover,	it	would	be	quite	difficult	to	ensure	their	value-freedom.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	new	forms	of	research	cannot	be	objective.	The	value-free	ideal	has	recently	been	questioned	in	philosophy	of	science.	There	are	several	senses	of	objectivity	that	do	not	require	value-freedom.	I	will	focus	on	the	question	whether	social	accounts	of	objectivity	could	be	useful	when	assessing	the	objectivity	of	democratic	knowledge	production	in	science.		
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3.	Objectivity	and	democracy	Objectivity	is	currently	the	theme	of	a	lively	philosophical	discussion,	influenced	also	by	science	studies	and	history	of	science	(e.g.	Daston	&	Galison	2007).	The	discussion	has	resulted	in	several	accounts	of	objectivity	that	are	diverse,	though	not	necessarily	incompatible	with	each	other.	What	precisely	should	be	objective	also	varies	in	these	accounts:	some	focus	on	the	objectivity	of	scientific	knowledge	claims,	others	on	the	process	through	which	the	claims	are	produced	or	the	scientific	communities	that	produce	them.	Ian	Hacking	(2015)	argues	that	philosophers	of	science	should	focus	on	analysing	whether	particular	instances	of	scientific	work	are	objective,	where	this	adjective	is	to	be	understood	in	a	negative	way	as	marking	the	absence	of	this	or	that	'vice'.	This	highlights	the	contextual	nature	of	objectivity	and	makes	it	understandable	why	there	are	so	many	senses	of	objectivity.	Objectivity	can	be	understood	in	a	pluralist	and	contextual	way;	the	vices	threatening	the	objectivity	of	science	can	differ	depending	on	the	context.	Non-epistemic	values	are	at	the	centre	of	the	current	discussions	around	objectivity.	As	noted,	according	to	the	traditional	view,	if	science	is	to	be	objective,	then	non-epistemic	values	must	be	kept	out	of	its	"internal"	stages	(e.g.	McMullin	1983;	see	also	Douglas	2009;	Reiss	&	Sprenger	2014).	However,	many	philosophers	of	science	have	questioned	the	ideal	of	value-freedom.	Amongst	others,	Richard	Rudner	(1953)	and	Heather	Douglas	(2007;	2009)	have	argued	that	researchers	need	to	make	some	decisions	that	necessarily	include	value	judgements	at	all	stages	of	research,	and	Douglas	notes	that	several	senses	of	objectivity	do	not	require	the	value-free	ideal.		Social	accounts	of	objectivity	in	particular	have	recently	received	much	attention.	Douglas	(2009)	identifies	three	different	senses	of	objectivity	that	focus	on	social	processes.	Two	of	them,	concordant	objectivity	and	interactive	
objectivity,	emphasise	the	social	nature	of	scientific	knowledge.	The	first	stresses	the	importance	of	intersubjective	agreement:	for	example,	we	call	an	observation	objective	when	an	appropriate	group	of	competent	observers	agree	on	it.	As	for	interactive	objectivity,	it	occurs	when	a	research	community	reaches	intersubjective	agreement	on	an	issue	after	an	intense	debate,	or	when	such	a	community	at	least	follows	inclusive	procedures	that	allow	effective	debates	to	be	had.		Social	accounts	of	objectivity	focus	on	scientific	communities.	The	idea	of	concordant	objectivity	requires	the	existence	of	an	appropriate	group	of	experts.	In	other	words,	it	requires	agreement	on	who	should	be	part	of	such	a	group,	or	somehow	represented	in	it,	for	the	group	to	be	appropriate.	Interactive	accounts	of	objectivity	take	scientific	communities	or	epistemic	communities	as	the	entity	whose	objectivity	is	to	be	assessed.	Objective	research	communities	should	sustain,	and	even	encourage,	diverse	and	competing	viewpoints.	They	should	
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also	be	responsive	to	outside	criticism	(Douglas	2009;	Longino	1990;	2002;	Wylie	2015).	The	idea	is	that	well-functioning	epistemic	communities	guarantee	efficient	debates	that	cancel	out	the	biases	of	individual	researchers.	Helen	Longino	(1990;	2002)	has	even	formulated	criteria	that	make	it	possible	to	evaluate	the	objectivity	of	research	communities.	The	key	point	of	the	criteria	is	effective	critical	interaction.	Collaborative	and	participatory	approaches	have	been	noticed	in	the	discussions	of	objectivity	(e.g.	Grasswick	2010;	Wylie	2015),	as	well	as	the	ideas	of	integrating	traditional	knowledge	with	scientific	knowledge,	and	taking	extra-academic	knowledge	systems	seriously	in	academia	(Harding	2011;	2015).	However,	philosophers	of	science	have	thus	far	mainly	concentrated	on	the	ways	in	which	collaboration	and	participation,	or	paying	attention	to	extra-academic	knowledge	systems,	can	increase	the	objectivity	of	scientific	knowledge	production	–	and	not	on	the	ways	in	which	the	new,	democratic	approaches	may	be	less	objective	than	is	hoped	(see	Koskinen	2015a).		Alison	Wylie	(2003;	2015)	has	recently	argued	in	favour	of	collaborative	approaches	in	archaeology.	She	combines	arguments	deriving	from	social	epistemology	and	feminist	philosophy	of	science,	and	stresses	the	potential	epistemic	advantages	of	giving	representatives	of	indigenous	communities	an	active	role	in	archaeological	research.	She	argues	that	when	researchers	get	acquainted	with	alternative	epistemic	traditions,	they	may	notice	problems	in	their	own	scientific	systems:	it	is	possible	that	"interaction	with	external,	alternative	knowledge	systems	will	destabilise	entrenched	epistemic	and	methodological	norms"	(Wylie	2015,	204).	One	of	the	objectives	of	participatory	research,	citizen	science,	transdisciplinarity,	and	activist	research	is	to	increase	the	public's	trust	in	science	(Hirsch	Hadorn	et	al.	2008;	Smith	1999).	In	feminist	philosophy	of	science,	trust	and	trustworthiness	have	been	linked	to	objectivity.	Naomi	Scheman	(2001)	has	argued	that	objectivity	is	connected	to	the	idea	of	universal	acceptability:	when	we	call	something	objective,	we	make	the	claim	that	others	too	should	accept	it.	Lay	communities	may,	however,	have	rational	reasons	for	distrusting	scientists.	Scheman	views	research	communities	as	epistemically	responsible	for	building	rationally	grounded	trust	not	only	within	the	research	communities	themselves,	but	also	in	lay	communities.	Heidi	Grasswick	(2010)	suggests	that	participatory	research	is	one	of	the	possible	ways	of	building	such	trust,	and	thus	of	increasing	the	objectivity	of	science.		Sandra	Harding	argues	that	strong	objectivity	requires	hearing	the	viewpoints	and	experiences	of	people	who	are	traditionally	excluded	from	scientific	knowledge	production.	Moreover,	she	talks	about	a	multiplicity	of	sciences.	Combining	feminist	and	postcolonial	thought,	she	demands	that	more	attention	be	paid	to	other	cultures'	sciences,	for	instance	indigenous	knowledge	systems	(Harding	2011;	2015;	see	also	Figueroa	&	Harding	2003).	
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As	noted,	however,	democracy	does	not	guarantee	objectivity.	The	new	forms	of	research	examined	here	may	have	to	face	the	risk	of	such	'vices'	as	threaten	their	objectivity	–	even	if	they	simultaneously	have	the	positive	effects	that	Wylie,	Scheman	and	Harding	emphasise.	If	we	understand	objectivity	in	a	pluralist	and	contextual	way,	this	is	understandable:	democratic	research	practices	may	reduce	the	likelihood	of	some	vices	while	increasing	the	likelihood	of	others.	But	if	a	scientific	community	is	reasonably	objective,	it	should	be	able	to	detect	and	correct	the	problems	that	arise,	and	to	produce	objective	results.	At	least	this	is	what	social	accounts	of	objectivity	claim.	It	seems	a	reasonable	idea	to	pay	attention	to	the	objectivity	of	research	communities	that	develop	democratic	forms	of	scientific	knowledge	production.		
4.	But	where	is	the	community?	In	philosophy	of	science	today,	the	notion	of	a	scientific	or	epistemic	community	is	used	widely,	and	it	is	especially	crucial	in	social	epistemology.	However,	the	concept	is	quite	vague.	A	scientific	community	is	often	simply	taken	to	be	an	"appropriately	constituted	group	of	people"	(Douglas	2007,	135).	As	Douglas	remarks,	this	raises	the	question	of	what	exactly	is	an	appropriately	constituted	group.	And	as	Lynn	Hankinson	Nelson	notes,	scientific	communities	have	"fuzzy,	often	overlapping	boundaries"	(Nelson	1993,	135).	In	practice,	such	vagueness	and	fuzziness	is	not	a	problem	as	long	as	the	communities	are	easily	identifiable.	But	in	transdisciplinary	research,	for	instance,	this	is	not	always	the	case.	As	I	will	argue,	social	accounts	of	objectivity	do	not	allow	for	situations	where	an	appropriately	constituted	group	is	not	easy	to	identify	–	and	this	is	the	case	in	some	of	the	new,	democratic	forms	of	scientific	knowledge	production.	Kristina	Rolin	(2009)	distinguishes	between	a	standard-based	and	an	expertise-based	notion	of	a	scientific	or	epistemic	community.	The	standard-based	notion	rests	upon	the	idea	that	a	scientific	community	shares	certain	standards	of	argumentation.	The	expertise-based	notion	takes	a	scientific	community	to	consist	of	scientists	who	"share	an	object	of	inquiry	and	a	particular	approach	to	its	study"	(Rolin	2009,	71)	–	typically,	the	representatives	of	a	discipline	or	a	research	programme.	Rolin	defends	the	latter	notion,	as	she	holds	that	scientists	ought	to	be	prepared	to	renounce	established	standards	when	faced	with	compelling	criticism,	and	the	standard-based	notion	does	not	allow	for	this.	I,	however,	will	argue	that	both	of	these	notions	lead	to	problematic	outcomes	when	we	examine	some	of	the	new,	democratic	forms	of	scientific	knowledge	production.	This	is	quite	clearly	the	case	in	ambitious	transdisciplinary	research;	but	as	we	shall	see,	even	less	ambitious	forms	of	democratisation	may	lead	to	scientific	research	where	it	is	difficult	to	identify	the	relevant	epistemic	community.	
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Whichever	of	the	two	notions	we	adopt,	an	ambitious	transdisciplinary	research	team,	if	it	succeeds	in	its	aims,	may	in	some	cases	become	the	only	identifiable	epistemic	community	related	to	a	specific	research	project.	This	is	because	transdisciplinary	projects	are	seen	as	a	way	to	tackle	problems	that	are	not	identified	in	disciplinary	terms,	and	to	do	so	by	creating	integrated	frameworks	that	do	not	belong	to	any	of	the	contributing	disciplines	or	to	any	of	the	extra-academic	agents	taking	part	in	the	project.	Transdisciplinarity	is	supposed	to	create	solutions	to	"wicked	problems"	that	monodisciplinary	research	is	unable	to	solve.	These	are	complex	and	ambiguous	problems	that	are	perceived	differently	by	the	different	groups	they	touch	(Brown	et	al.	2010).	Such	problems	are	by	definition	not	the	object	of	inquiry	for	any	existing	scientific	community.	To	succeed,	a	transdisciplinary	project	is	supposed	to	create	a	framework	of	integrated	methods,	concepts,	criteria	and	so	on	(Pohl	et	al.	2008).	If	the	wicked	problem	is	a	global	one,	a	new	research	community	may	in	time	develop	around	it,	as	has	happened	in	the	case	of	climate	science.	However,	not	all	wicked	problems	are	global.	A	transdisciplinary	research	team	that	is	trying	to	solve	a	local	wicked	problem	may	well	be	working	alone:	no	larger	community	shares	the	same	object	of	inquiry.	And	as	it	is	supposed	to	create	a	framework	of	its	own,	it	is	also	likely	that	there	is	no	larger	community	that	would	share	the	same	standards.	The	only	identifiable	epistemic	community	seems	to	be	the	research	team	itself	(see	also	Koskinen	&	Mäki	2016).	Research	teams	cannot	take	charge	of	all	of	the	epistemic	functions	assigned	to	scientific	communities	in	the	philosophical	literature.	They	are	typically	too	small	and	interdependent	to	be	able	to	create	effective	critical	interaction	(Koskinen	&	Mäki	2016).	Particularly	in	interactive	accounts	of	objectivity,	epistemic	communities	are	supposed	to	guarantee	that	the	work	of	individual	researchers	is	scrutinised	from	a	rich	variety	of	perspectives.	For	instance,	Longino	(2002)	holds	that	it	is	important	not	only	to	allow	potentially	dissenting	voices	in	scientific	communities,	but	also	to	cultivate	them.	Miriam	Solomon	(2006)	has	noted	that	so-called	"groupthink",	perceived	or	internalised	pressure	from	peers	and	group	leaders,	may	prevent	dissenting	individuals	from	sharing	their	critical	thoughts.	As	Rolin	(2011)	argues,	groupthink	can	be	avoided	in	tolerably	large,	socially	dispersed	scientific	communities.	But	research	teams	are	not	immune	to	it.	They	are	not	able	by	themselves	to	ensure	diversity	and	effective	criticism.2	As	noted,	even	less	ambitious	(and	perhaps	more	realistic)	forms	of	democratic	knowledge	production	can	lead	to	situations	where	it	is	difficult	to	identify	the	relevant	epistemic	community	or	communities.	In	these	cases	the	difficulty	is	not																																																									2	In	fact,	interdependence	can	also	be	a	problem	in	very	large	research	teams.	There	are	projects	such	as	the	Human	Genome	Project,	or	the	work	of	the	Large	Hadron	Collider	at	CERN,	where	it	can	be	hard	to	get	effective	criticism,	as	the	projects	are	so	massive	that	practically	every	competent	critic	is	already	associated	with	them.	(I	am	grateful	for	an	anonymous	referee	for	pointing	this	out.)	
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so	much	in	there	being	no	community	larger	than	the	research	team.	Rather,	every	relevant	epistemic	community	is	not	recognised.	This	can	bring	on	a	problem	from	which	interdisciplinary	projects	also	sometimes	suffer:	critique	that	is	unbalanced	and	therefore	insufficient.	Interdisciplinary	projects	quite	often	receive	excessive	criticism,	as	people	representing	the	different	disciplines	involved	in	the	project	all	criticise	it	from	their	own	point	of	view,	without	necessarily	understanding	the	whole.	In	some	cases,	however,	an	opposite	problem	occurs:	one	or	several	of	the	disciplines	involved	in	an	interdisciplinary	project	are	not	involved,	or	are	insufficiently	involved,	in	the	critical	discussion	concerning	the	project,	or	the	critique	is	disregarded	(see	Mäki	2013).	As	a	result,	an	interdisciplinary	paper	may	end	up	being	published	in	a	prestigious	journal	although	most	representatives	of	one	of	the	disciplines	involved	would	consider	it	defective.	In	an	interdisciplinary	context,	however,	such	situations	typically	result	from	shortcomings	in	the	communication	between	already	identified	epistemic	communities.	I	will	argue	that	in	the	new,	democratic	forms	of	research	the	problem	is	more	serious.	It	is	fully	possible	that	all	epistemic	communities	related	to	a	research	project	function	in	a	generally	satisfactory	manner,	and	could	be	deemed	quite	objective,	but	that	the	researchers	do	not	receive	important	critique	because	not	all	relevant	communities	have	been	identified.	To	illustrate	the	difficulty,	let	us	consider	an	example.		
5.	The	flood	myth	A	certain	type	of	story	has	been	recurring	in	both	scientific	journals	and	popular	magazines	for	some	decades	now.	The	story	links	indigenous	oral	traditions	to	geological	events,	tsunamis	or	floods	that	happened	hundreds	or	even	thousands	of	years	ago.	It	is	based	on	a	distinctly	democratic	idea:	scientists	acknowledge	that	the	stories	indigenous	people	tell	about	the	past	have	been	unjustly	dismissed	as	unreliable.	So	they	decide	to	take	the	stories	"not	as	myth,	but	as	history"	(Finkbeiner	2015).	Both	indigenous	activist	researchers	and	other	researchers	from	various	fields,	sometimes	collaborating	with	indigenous	communities,	find	links	between	the	stories	and	past	natural	catastrophes,	and	thus	claim	to	have	proven	that	the	oral	tradition	can	be	a	reliable	source	of	historical	knowledge.	Often	the	aim	is	to	learn	from	traditional	knowledge,	as	it	may	prove	useful	for	purposes	such	as	disaster	risk	reduction	related	to	natural	hazards.	Here	I	will	roughly	outline	cases	where	activists	and	researchers	take	up	orally	transmitted	stories	about	great	floods	and	attempt	to	link	them	in	diverse	ways	to	experiences	of	past	floods	or	tsunamis.	Some	of	the	examples	are	activist	research,	others	participatory	projects,	and	in	some	the	scientists	try	to	integrate	indigenous	and	scientific	knowledge	systems.	The	examples	are	to	some	degree	influenced	by	each	other,	but	they	cut	across	many	different	disciplines.	After	describing	them	I	will	point	out	that	relevant	critique	from	folkloristics	is	
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missing	from	this	literature.	Finally	I	will	proceed	to	argue	that	social	accounts	of	objectivity	do	not	quite	suffice	when	assessing	the	situation.		Indigenous	activists	and	activist	researchers,	especially	in	North	America,	have	criticised	western	science	during	the	past	half-century	for	its	unjust	and	flawed	treatment	of	indigenous	people.	Anthropology	and	archaeology	have	faced	especially	severe	criticism.	Activist	researchers	accuse	anthropologists	of	not	acknowledging	the	value	of	indigenous	knowledge.	They	argue	that	indigenous	knowledge	systems	should	not	be	treated	"simply	as	interesting	objects	of	study	(claims	that	some	believe	to	be	true)	but	as	intellectual	orientations	that	map	out	ways	of	discovering	things	about	the	world"	(Garroutte	2003,	10).		One	of	the	most	prominent	figures	in	this	critical	movement,	Vine	Deloria,	Jr.,	has	accused	scientists	of	misrepresenting	and	distorting	the	history	of	Native	Americans	(e.g.	Deloria	1969;	1995).	When	reconstructing	the	history	of	Native	Americans	as	they	tell	it	themselves,	Deloria	and	many	other	activist	researchers	have	linked	orally	transmitted	stories	telling	of	great	floods	to	actual,	prehistoric	floods	of	which	there	is	geological	or	archaeological	evidence	(e.g.	Cruikshank	1981;	Deloria	1995;	Churchill	2005).	Deloria	acknowledges	that	cultural	researchers	avoid	making	such	connections:	"Scholars	in	comparative	religion,	anthropology,	psychology,	and	folklore	usually	steer	well	clear	of	using	flood	stories	for	anything	except	demonstrating	that	all	societies	have	these	kinds	of	stories"	(Deloria	1995,	187).	He,	however,	wishes	to	take	the	traditional	stories	seriously,	and	links	them	to	glacial	lake	outburst	floods	and	tsunamis.	Deloria	is	a	vehement	critic	of	science,	and	has	been	accused	of	advancing	plainly	pseudoscientific	claims	(e.g.	Brumble	1998).	However,	the	idea	of	comparing	indigenous	traditional	knowledge	to	geological	or	archaeological	evidence	has	also	been	adopted	by	researchers	who	believe	that	scientific	and	indigenous	knowledge	can	be	reconciled	and	integrated.	Some	of	them	are	indigenous	activist	researchers,	others	represent	diverse	disciplines.	They	wish	to	use	oral	traditions	for	a	wide	variety	of	purposes	–	for	instance	the	study	of	climate	change	(Cruikshank	2001),	or	the	development	of	more	efficient	and	emancipatory	earth	science	education	(Johnson	et	al.	2014).		The	flood	stories	have	intrigued	especially	researchers	focusing	on	disaster	risk	reduction	related	to	natural	hazards.	In	development	studies,	this	has	led	to	many	collaborative	and	participatory	projects	in	regions	threatened	by	tsunamis	or	floods.	In	Indigenous	Knowledge	for	Disaster	Risk	Reduction,	a	book	published	by	the	United	Nations	Office	for	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	and	the	European	Union,	one	of	the	editors,	Jennifer	Baumwoll,	summarises	the	main	aims	of	such	projects	as	follows:	Valuable,	risk-reducing	practices	may	be	embedded	in	traditional	knowledge,	and	they	may	be	transferrable.	For	example,	both	the	Simeulueans	and	the	Moken	survived	the	devastating	2004	Indian	Ocean	
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Tsunami	by	resorting	to	strategies	described	in	oral	tradition.	It	may	be	possible	to	adapt	such	strategies	to	other	communities.	Moreover,	taking	indigenous	knowledge	seriously	and	engaging	the	communities	in	disaster	risk	reduction	both	empowers	the	communities	and	can	provide	valuable	information	about	the	local	context.	Finally,	education	on	risk	reduction	may	be	more	efficient	if	it	is	disseminated	in	similar	ways	as	traditional	knowledge	(Shaw	et	al.	2008,	vii;	see	also	Shaw	et	al.	2009;	Hiwasaki	et	al.	2014).		The	flood	stories	have	been	noted	also	in	the	geosciences,	partly	for	the	same	reasons	as	in	development	studies:	knowledge	about	past	natural	catastrophes	may	prove	to	be	policy-relevant.	But	unlike	in	development	studies,	where	the	focus	is	largely	on	efficient	practices	and	strategies,	some	geoscientists	follow	the	lead	of	indigenous	activist	researchers	and	try	to	use	oral	stories	as	historical	evidence.		Already	in	1985	Thomas	H.	Heaton	and	Parke	D.	Snavely,	a	seismologist	and	a	geologist,	published	a	short	paper	in	which	they	cited	some	indigenous	stories	and	suggested	that	they	may	concern	past	tsunamis.	The	stories	in	question	have	also	been	highlighted	by	indigenous	activists,	and	Deloria	(1997,	188)	mentions	them.	In	2002	Alan	D.	McMillan,	an	archaeologist	and	ethnographer	who	has	collaborated	extensively	with	the	First	Nations	of	the	northwestern	coast	of	Canada,	and	Ian	Hutchinson,	a	geographer,	published	a	new	article	on	these	stories.	They	examine	the	possibility	that	stories	recorded	along	the	northwest	coast	of	North	America	tell	about	past	earthquakes	and	tsunamis	related	to	the	Cascadia	Subduction	Zone,	and	hold	some	of	the	stories	to	be	related	to	a	known	earthquake	and	tsunami	that	occurred	in	1700	AD	(McMillan	&	Hutchinson	2002).		In	2016	Patrick	Nunn,	a	geographer,	and	Nicholas	J.	Reid,	a	linguist,	published	a	much	more	daring	article,	in	which	they	claim	to	have	proven	that	the	oral	traditions	of	Australian	aboriginal	groups	"tell	of	a	time	when	the	former	coastline	of	mainland	Australia	was	inundated	by	rising	sea	level"	(Nunn	&	Reid	2016,	1)	over	7000	years	ago.	By	integrating	indigenous	knowledge	with	scientific	knowledge	they	attempt	to	create	a	more	detailed	picture	of	the	past	coastlines	than	is	otherwise	possible.		The	two	last	mentioned	articles	(McMillan	&	Hutchinson	2002;	Nunn	&	Reid	2016)	attracted	the	attention	of	the	popular	press	and	led	to	a	large	number	of	newspaper	stories	with	titles	like	"Understanding	the	Pacific's	Earthquakes	Through	Indigenous	Stories"	(Finkbeiner	2015)	and	"Australian	Aboriginal	Stories	of	Ancient	Sea-Level	Rise	Preserved	for	13,000	Years"	(Sci-News	2015).		Of	course	there	has	also	been	criticism,	not	only	of	Deloria's	ideas,	but	also	of	the	more	moderate	attempts	to	use	oral	traditions	as	historical	evidence.	Especially	questioned	has	been	the	possibility	of	orally	transmitted	stories	to	remain	
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unchanged	for	long	periods	of	time	(e.g.	Mason	2006).	Activists	and	researchers	who	wish	to	take	the	stories	seriously	argue	against	such	doubts.	They	point	out	that	the	narratives	cohere	with	archaeological	or	geological	data.	They	also	emphasise	the	mixed	nature	of	oral	tradition	and	claim	that	the	historical	elements	can	be	distinguished	from	mythical	ones	(e.g.	Cruikshank	1981;	McMillan	&	Hutchinson	2002).	From	the	point	of	view	of	someone	who	is	acquainted	with	contemporary	scholarship	on	myths	in	folkloristics,	the	discussion	seems	to	rest	on	a	set	of	problematic	assumptions	and	to	remain	too	abstract.	I	will	now	try	to	outline	two	criticisms	that	are	largely	missing	from	the	discussion,	but	are	in	my	view	relevant	to	it.	First,	one	must	be	cautious	when	oral	tradition	seems	to	cohere	with	geological	or	archaeological	evidence,	as	myths	typically	cohere	with	many	different	things.	Second,	the	flood	myth	has	been	studied	extensively.	This	work	should	not	be	disregarded	when	researchers	try	to	use	orally	transmitted	stories	about	floods	as	sources	of	historical	knowledge.	Taking	the	work	into	account	is	crucial	if	one	wishes	to	distinguish	historical	elements	from	mythical	ones.	Comparative	studies	have	shown	that	there	are	elements	in	oral	traditions	that	are	known	virtually	all	over	the	world.	Although	these	recurring	ideas	have	most	likely	been	invented	many	times,	it	seems	that	they	have	also	spread	over	very	long	distances.	This	indicates	that	they	are	indeed	very	old;	detailed	similarities	between	stories	told	in	spatially	distant	traditions	are	otherwise	hard	to	explain.	However,	it	is	also	clear	that	the	events	described	in	such	stories	cannot	be	reliably	linked	to	any	specific	place	or	time.	(Siikala	2002;	2012;	Lukin,	Frog	&	Katajamäki	2013.)	According	to	folklorists,	then,	elements	of	oral	tradition	can	indeed	be	very	old,	perhaps	even	thousands	of	years	old.	But	the	oldest	elements	in	oral	traditions	are	mythical.	A	myth	can	be	defined	as	"a	sacred	narrative	explaining	how	the	world	or	humans	came	to	be	in	their	present	form"	(Dundes	1988,	1).	Both	local	histories	and	mythical	histories	tell	about	the	past	of	the	community	whose	members	know	the	stories,	but	local	histories	tell	about	the	mundane	world,	whereas	the	events	of	mythical	history	happen	close	to	the	boundaries	between	our	world	and	hereafter.	Folklorists	do	not	see	history	and	myth	as	opposites,	but	as	two	distinct	strategies	for	telling	about	the	past	of	the	community	(Siikala	2012;	see	also	Sahlins	1985).	The	different	variants	of	the	widespread	myths	are	typically	localised:	they	mention	places,	heroes	and	other	figures	familiar	to	the	people	who	tell	them.	This	feature	of	myths	is	actually	tied	to	something	that	has	been	suggested	as	a	reason	for	their	longevity.	Stories	telling	about	actual	local	events	are	relatively	short-lived,	as	they	usually	become	inconsequential	over	time.	Mythical	stories,	on	the	other	hand,	relate	to	timeless	issues.	They	are	precisely	the	kind	of	stories	that	can	easily	be	reinterpreted	and	recontextualised	over	and	over	again,	and	
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are	always	relevant.	This	ensures	their	continuity.	(Siikala	2002;	2012;	Knuuttila	2009.)		Although	myths	do	indeed	become	intertwined	with	other	kinds	of	stories	telling	about	the	past,	and	although	it	is	in	principle	possible	that	echoes	of	very	old	events	could	survive	in	local	variants	of	the	most	basic	myths,	proving	this	in	any	specific	case	would	therefore	be	extremely	difficult.	The	fact	that	oral	tradition	can	be	interpreted	as	cohering,	for	instance,	with	geological	conditions	thousands	of	years	ago,	is	not	surprising.	It	is	characteristic	of	a	myth	to	be	applicable	in	a	wide	variety	of	contexts,	and	to	be	easily	reinterpreted	and	relocalised.		The	Motif-Index	of	Folk	Literature	by	Stith	Thompson	(1955–58)	mentions	relatively	few	major	myth	types.	One	of	them	is	the	flood	myth:	inundation	of	the	whole	world	or	a	section	of	it.	Variants	of	this	myth	are	known	virtually	all	over	the	world,	and	it	has	repeatedly	been	interpreted	historically.	In	the	19th	century,	when	modern	geology	started	to	seriously	undermine	the	Biblical	account	of	the	history	of	the	world,	the	culmination	point	of	the	debate	was	the	story	about	Noah	and	the	great	flood,	and	whether	it	could	be	reconciled	with	the	scientific	discoveries	(Dundes	1988).	Clearly	the	flood	myth	has	the	capacity	to	stir	our	imaginations	from	generation	to	generation.		Researchers	who	wish	to	use	orally	transmitted	stories	about	floods	as	historical	evidence	should	take	the	existing	knowledge	about	the	flood	myth	into	account.	Otherwise	they	risk	basing	their	interpretations	on	features	of	the	stories	that	are	very	likely	or	even	undoubtedly	mythical.	In	none	of	the	articles	mentioned	above	do	the	authors	systematically	compare	the	stories	they	examine	to	other	variants	of	the	flood	myth.3	Most	of	the	stories	include	very	typical	elements	of	the	flood	myth	(Thompson	1955–58,	A1018,	A1021,	A1022).	It	is	not	thus	possible	to	determine	to	what	degree,	if	any,	the	stories	can	actually	be	connected	to	specific	places	and	historical	events.		The	ideas	from	folkloristics	I	have	just	presented	have	not	been	taken	into	account	in	the	literature	I	outlined.	If	this	happened	in	a	monodisciplinary	context,	it	would	be	reasonable	to	conclude	that	the	epistemic	community	is	less	efficient	in	its	critical	discussions	than	would	be	desirable:	a	relevant	critical	viewpoint	has	been	ignored.	However,	the	context	is	not	monodisciplinary.	Many	of	the	researchers	who	wish	to	interpret	the	flood	stories	historically	have	likely																																																									3	Deloria	acknowledges	that	the	stories	need	to	be	"demythologised",	but	he	takes	this	to	mean	simply	that	ideas	of	crime	and	punishment	must	be	eliminated	from	them	(Deloria	1997,	188).	Nunn	and	Reid	(2016)	are	aware	of	the	similarities	between	the	Australian	stories	they	examine	and	variants	of	the	flood	myth	known	all	around	the	world,	but	they	emphasise	the	fact	that	in	the	Australian	stories	the	flood	does	not	recede	as	it	does	in	many	well-known	variants	of	the	flood	myth,	and	conclude	that	the	stories	therefore	differ	from	similar	traditions	elsewhere.	However,	the	receding	of	the	flood	is	not	a	universal	feature	of	the	myth	(Thompson	1955–58;	Dundes	1988).	
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been	unaware	of	the	full	critique	that	could	be	offered	to	them.	Indigenous	activist	researchers,	geologists,	geographers,	linguists,	or	even	archaeologists	are	not	necessarily	well	acquainted	with	recent	discussions	in	folkloristics.	Even	when	extra-academic	experts,	such	as	members	of	indigenous	communities,	are	consulted,	they	are	not	likely	to	be	able	to	help	either:	they	may	know	very	much	about	the	oral	traditions,	but	not	about	the	comparative	research	on	myths	conducted	by	folklorists.	And	although	folklorists	tend	to	grimace	when	they	come	across	news	stories	about	amazing	evidence	that	links	oral	traditions	to	geological	events	that	happened	thousands	of	years	ago,	they	do	not	necessarily	end	up	offering	very	effective	critiques.	They	may	not	attend	the	same	conferences	or	publish	in	the	same	journals	as	the	researchers	who	make	such	claims.	As	noted,	similar	problems	also	occur	in	interdisciplinary	research.	However,	in	interdisciplinary	projects	the	main	contributions	come	from	the	team	members,	who	are	all	scientific	experts	and	thus	likely	to	be	aware	of	relevant	research	related	to	what	they	bring	into	the	project.	The	problem	illustrated	above	can	be	particularly	acute	in	the	contemporary,	democratic	forms	of	scientific	knowledge	production.	Researchers	who	attempt	to	democratise	science	often	wish	to	make	use	of	extra-academic	knowledge,	expertise	and	ideas	in	ways	that	are	not	customary	in	their	fields.	Their	own	epistemic	communities	cannot	offer	expert	criticism;	seismologists	in	general	do	not	know	how	to	properly	interpret	oral	traditions,	or	how	to	use	them	as	evidence.	And	there	may	be	no	one	in	the	team,	or	close	to	it,	who	is	aware	of	scientific	work	relevantly	related	to	the	extra-academic	ideas	or	knowledge	used	by	it.		
6.	Conclusions:	Democratisation	of	science	and	social	accounts	of	objectivity	I	have	raised	two	issues	that	I	believe	to	require	more	philosophical	attention.	First,	the	democratisation	of	scientific	knowledge	production	may	make	certain	'vices'	that	threaten	the	objectivity	of	science	more	common	than	used	to	be	the	case.	Second,	the	available	social	accounts	of	objectivity	presuppose	the	existence	of	easily	identifiable	epistemic	communities.	The	limits	of	their	applicability	become	apparent	in	situations	where	such	identification	is	difficult.	It	is	very	likely	that	this	can	happen	in	several	ways	and	contexts.	I	have	examined	two	ways	in	which	it	can	happen	in	the	context	of	democratising	scientific	knowledge	production.	First,	an	ambitious	transdisciplinary	research	team	can	in	some	cases	become	the	only	identifiable	epistemic	community	related	to	a	specific	research	project.	Because	of	the	risk	of	groupthink,	research	teams	cannot	take	charge	of	all	of	the	epistemic	functions	assigned	to	scientific	communities	in	the	philosophical	literature,	so	there	is	no	proper	epistemic	community	to	be	found.		
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Second,	even	in	more	moderate	forms	of	democratic	knowledge	production,	one	or	more	relevant	epistemic	communities	may	remain	unidentified.	The	social	accounts	of	objectivity	can	be	referred	to	when	analysing	the	'vice'	threatening	objectivity	in	such	situations.	However,	neither	of	two	senses	of	objectivity	mentioned	in	Section	3,	concordant	and	interactive,	quite	captures	what	is	central	to	it.	The	results	reported	in	the	articles	examined	in	the	previous	section	cannot	be	called	objective	in	the	concordant	sense	of	objectivity,	as	an	appropriately	constituted	group	does	not	agree	on	them	–	but	the	disagreement	has	gone	undetected,	as	it	has	been	unclear	precisely	who	should	belong	to	the	appropriately	constituted	group.	It	is	not	the	disagreement,	but	the	unclarity	about	the	composition	of	the	community,	that	has	led	the	same	shortcomings	to	recur	over	and	over	again.	The	kind	of	critical,	effective	interaction	stressed	in	interactive	accounts	of	objectivity	has	been	lacking	–	but	it	is	hard	to	identify	an	epistemic	community	that	is	to	blame.	We	can	recognise	several	communities	that	share	standards	of	argumentation	or	an	object	of	inquiry,	but	their	standards	are	not	developed	for	assessing	interpretations	of	oral	traditions,	nor	are	myths	among	their	typical	objects	of	inquiry.	Even	if	the	community	of	geographers,	for	instance,	followed	social-epistemic	practices	that	in	the	case	of	monodisciplinary	or	even	interdisciplinary	research	would	ensure	effective	debates,	the	community	could	easily	fail	to	find	the	folkloristic	critique.	And	as	folklorists	do	not	attend	geography	conferences	or	read	geography	journals,	they	could	easily	remain	unaware	that	they	would	be	able	to	offer	relevant	critique.	It	is	hard	to	see	these	as	sufficient	reasons	for	questioning	the	interactive	objectivity	of	either	community.	And	finally,	because	of	the	risk	of	groupthink,	the	responsibility	of	finding	all	of	the	relevant	critique	is	too	heavy	a	burden	for	the	individual	research	teams	developing	new,	more	democratic	forms	of	research.	Sometimes	the	democratisation	of	scientific	knowledge	production	has	led	to	the	formation	of	new	scientific	communities,	such	as	the	community	of	indigenous	activist	researchers.	Social	accounts	of	objectivity	can	be	fruitful	in	the	assessment	of	such	communities	(see	Koskinen	2015b).	However,	democratic	knowledge	production	does	not	always	result	in	the	formation	of	new	communities.	Rather,	"democratic"	ideas	can	spread	from	one	epistemic	community	to	another	in	the	way	that	theories	sometimes	spread.	Attempts	to	democratise	scientific	knowledge	production	can	also	result	in	situations	where	it	is	hard	to	identify	any	clear	community	at	all.	In	such	situations,	the	applicability	of	current	social	accounts	of	objectivity	is	limited.			
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